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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Montero, David Facility: Wyoming CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: 04-A-3629 
Appearances: 
Decision appealed: 
Board Member(s) 
who participated: 
Papers considered: 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Norman P. Effman, Esq. 
Wyoming Co. Legal Aid 
18 Linwood A venue 
Warsaw, New York 14569 
07-042-18 B 
June 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 15-
months. 
Smith, Davis, Demosthenes 
Appellant's Brief received November 6, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan .. 
~Orsigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
--~'-lfl'!:.../----+'""" ,.._Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~rmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ _ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination!!'.!!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit 's Findings and the separjlte f}ndings 9~ 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on c.~ld7jl9' /56. 
; " ,, :,-.,q;.,n \pr\.-.ll" l 'nit .~prclla111 - .\pp~llani"s C\1u11si..:I - ln:-.L Par~ik File -( l:ntrnl File 
;; :"u•J;H) ( 11 201~) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Montero, David DIN: 04-A-3629
Facility: Wyoming CF AC No.: 07-042-18 B
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Appellant challenges the June 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a hold of 15 months. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious and made in violation of applicable legal authority, with too little consideration 
being given to Appellant’s achievements, parole packet, and release plans; (2) certain issues were 
not discussed during the interview to the satisfaction of Appellant; (3) the Board should not have 
asked Appellant if there was a plea offer relative to his current crimes of conviction; (4) the 15-
month hold was excessive; (5) the Board did not properly consider the COMPAS instrument. 
As to the first issue, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1273-
74, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 
N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely 
within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 
N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; 
Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 
(1st Dept. 1997).   
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In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
            As to the second issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
As to the third issue, the Board is not prohibited from asking about the circumstances 
surrounding the crimes of conviction.  The Board is entitled to rely on the sentencing minutes and 
to consider the circumstances of the crime. See, e.g., Matter of Platten v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 153 A.D.3d 1509, 59 N.Y.S.3d 921 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Herouard v. Travis, 273 
A.D.2d 236, 237, 709 N.Y.S.2d 449 (2d Dept. 2000).  Appellant’s attorney states in his brief that 
this alleged prohibition against inquiry into any plea offer was not based upon legal authority but 
upon his “opinion”.  This is because there is no legal authority to support his “opinion”, and in 
fact, the Board can consider the circumstances surrounding the crimes of conviction, which would 
include plea offers. 
As to the fourth issue, the Board has discretion to hold an inmate for a period of up to 24 
months. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b); Matter of Tatta v. State of 
N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 
604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 
(3d Dept. 2013).  Therefore, the hold of 15 months was not excessive or improper. 
As to the fifth issue, in 2011 the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk 
and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 
259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
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offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Additionally, even certain low 
COMPAS scores would not have placed the onus on the Board to provide countervailing evidence 
to support its determination.  The 2011 amendments require the Board to incorporate risk and 
needs assessment principles to “assist” in measuring an inmate’s rehabilitation and likelihood of 
success upon release.  See Executive Law § 259-c(4). The statute thus does not clearly create a 
presumption of rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and needs assessment, let alone a 
presumption of parole release requiring the Board to provide countervailing evidence.  Indeed, 
while the Board might, for example, find an inmate sufficiently rehabilitated to satisfy the first 
prong of the standard—that the inmate will “live and remain at liberty without violating the law,” 
the Board could also find, in its discretion, that the inmate’s release would be incompatible with 
the welfare of society, or would unduly deprecate the seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute 
therefore flatly contradicts the inmate’s assertion that certain low COMPAS scores create a 
presumption of release. See Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
